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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900202-CA 
v. : 
FRANK GENE POWELL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether defendant understood the 
effect of his guilty plea and the various constitutional and 
statutory rights he was waiving. A reviewing court "will not 
interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has 
failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a guilty plea] 
unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his 
discretion." State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended 
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990J.1 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was redesignated as 
rule 11(5). 
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court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 11, 1987 defendant was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 19). On May 20, 1988, an amended 
information was filed charging defendant with manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990) (R. 81). On the same day defendant pleaded guilty to that 
charge (R. 186). Defendant was sentenced to serve an 
undetermined term of not less than one year or more than 15 years 
at the Utah State Prison (R. 100-02). 
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea (R. 104). A hearing on defendant's motion was 
held on November 3, 1989. The trial court issued a memorandum 
decision denying defendant's motion on March 30, 1990 (R. 168-
78). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 4, 1990 (R. 
179). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to the 
charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). (A copy of the transcript of 
the plea hearing is attached hereto as Addendum A). At the 
hearing on defendant's guilty plea the trial judge asked 
defendant his educational level and ability to read and speak the 
English language (R. 183); whether defendant was being treated 
for any mental illness or was under the influence of drugs or 
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alcohol (R. 184); whether defendant understood the constitutional 
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (R. 184); whether he 
understood the contents of the affidavit explaining his rights 
that he had reviewed with his attorney (R. 184) (a copy of 
defendant's affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum B); whether 
anyone had used any force, duress or coercion against him (R. 
184); and whether defendant considered the statement of facts 
concerning the events giving rise to the death in question, as 
recounted by the county attorney, to be true and accurate (R. 
185). After defendant answered the questions to the trial 
court's satisfaction, defendant was permitted to sign the 
affidavit, and the court accepted his plea of guilty (R. 184-5). 
The court stated that the plea was a result of a plea agreement 
and that the court had discussed the agreement and its 
circumstances with the county attorney (R. 185-86). 
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. At the plea hearing defendant 
testified that he did not realize that, by pleading guilty, he 
was giving up his right to trial, to testify and to hear 
witnesses against him (R. 192-94). Defendant also testified that 
he believed he would serve no more than 18 months in prison as a 
result of his plea (195-96). Defendant's trial counsel also 
testified concerning the taking of defendant's plea. He noted 
that he was aware of defendant's limited educational background 
and difficulty in understanding the legal concepts involved in a 
guilty plea (R. 204). As a consequence, trial counsel 
extensively reviewed and, at times, paraphrased the affidavits 
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defendant was to sign in conjunction with his plea. (R. 205-06, 
208-18). Included in the review was a discussion concerning 
defendant's sentence, counsel's assessment of the time he thought 
defendant would spend in prison, and the trial court's absolute 
prerogative in imposing sentence (R. 212-14). Trial counsel 
firmly believed that defendant understood exactly the rights he 
was waiving and the penalties that attached to a plea (R. 208). 
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the trial court, applying the "record on a whole" standard, 
found that defendant's motive for moving to withdraw the plea was 
"buyer's remorse" resulting from his failure to gain parole in 18 
months (R. 177). He concluded that defendant understood his 
guilty plea and its consequences (Ld.). (A copy of the trial 
court's memorandum is attached hereto as Addendum C.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because defendant has failed to allege 
that his rights have been violated substantially by the 
acceptance of his plea, and the record supports the fact that 
defendant's plea was voluntary and knowing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
On appeal defendant claims that he did not fully 
understand the effects of his plea and the various constitutional 
and statutory rights he was waiving (Br. of App. at 6). However, 
defendant makes no specific allegations as to what "effects" he 
-5-
did not understand or what constitutional and statutory rights he 
2 
did not know he was waiving. 
Defendant does not allege that his plea was not 
intelligent and voluntary, the traditional indices used in 
determining the validity of a guilty plea. See Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1968); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1273 (Utah 1988). Instead, defendant relies on an on-the-
record "strict compliance" with rule 11(e) argument to urge the 
3 
reversal of the trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 14-15). 
The State is fully aware of this Court's recent 
decisions concerning withdrawals of guilty pleas. This Court has 
made it clear in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. 
App.) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v. Valencia, 
776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. August 24, 1990); and State v. 
Pharris, No. 890549-CA (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), that it 
The federal constitutional rights waived when a guilty plea is 
entered include the fifth amendment rights against self-
incrimination and of a trial by jury and the sixth amendment 
right to confront one's accusers. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 234 (1968). 
3 
Defendant also offers a nominal "record as a whole" argument 
but fails to specify what he did not understand at the time he 
entered his plea. (Br. of App. at 16.) Moreover, in conjunction 
with that argument defendant erroneously cited to Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (1989) cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990), as 
a case where the Utah Supreme Court upheld a lower court's 
findings by applying "clear and convincing evidence" standard of 
review. (Br. of App. at 16.) To the contrary, the court in 
Jolivet applied the standard that it would "not set aside trial 
court findings of fact as 'clearly erroneous' unless they . . . 
[were] against the clear weight of the evidences, or . . • thev 
appellate court otherwise reache[d] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake [had] been made.'" Id. at 1150 (citing 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)";; Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a)). 
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will apply an on-the-record "strict compliance" with rule 11(e) 
test in assessing the validity of a guilty plea, interpreting 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) as creating a 
substantively new rule in guilty plea cases and replacing the 
prior "record as a whole" test. If this Court applies an on-the-
record "strict compliance" test to the instant case, it will 
undoubtedly find that the trial court did not conduct the 
complete on-the-record review with defendant of the rule 11(e) 
requirements as mandated Vasilacopulos, Valencia, Gentry and 
Pharris. 
As set forth in its briefs in those cases, the State 
believes that Gibbons did not substantively change the rule on 
withdrawal of guilty pleas and that the "record as a whole" test 
still governs the plea withdrawals. Consequently, the State has 
several cases pending before the Utah Supreme Court on this 
4 
issue. Until the issue is finally resolved by that court, the 
State will continue to urge that this Court reconsider the 
"record as a whole" test and will continue to assert the 
5 
correctness of that standard. 
The instant case excellently illustrates the 
deficiencies the State sees in the application of the strict 
compliance test. Defendant fails to allege any specific harm 
4 
State v. Hoff, No. 900096, is currently before the Utah Supreme 
Court, and the State is petitioning for writs of certiorari in 
Gentry and Pharris. 
Although the State concedes that, in light of Gentry and 
Pharris, this Court is unlikely to retreat from its conclusion 
that the record as a whole test no longer governs, it believes 
that continued argument on this point is necessary to preserve 
the issue for possible certiorari review. 
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suffered as a result of the taking of his guilty plea. He does 
not and cannot allege any constitutional deficiencies or that his 
plea was not voluntary and knowing because he knew precisely what 
he was doing when he entered his guilty plea. At the time of his 
plea defendant specifically stated that he had gone over the 
affidavit explaining his rights with his attorney, that he knew 
he was waiving certain constitutional rights and that those 
rights had been explained to him by his attorney (R. 184). The 
affidavit/ each paragraph of which is initialed, substantially 
met rule 11(e) requirements. Paragraphs 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 
25 attest to the voluntariness of the plea as required by rule 
11(e)(2) (R. 86-87). Rule 11(e)(3)'s requirements that a 
defendant know of certain constitutional rights he or she is 
waiving are met as follows: (1) the right against self-
incrimination in paragraph 8E; the right to jury trial in 
paragraph 8; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in 
paragraphs 8B and C; and that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver 
of those rights in paragraph 10B (R. 83, 84-85). Paragraph 9 
sets forth the elements of the offense, paragraphs 8G and 9 the 
fact that the prosecution has the burden of proving each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt and paragraph 10 the fact that a guilty 
plea is an admission of the elements of the crime charged, as 
required by rule 11(e)(4) (R. 83-84). Rule 11(e)(5)'s 
requirements that a defendant know of the maximum sentence that 
may be imposed and the possibility of consecutive terms are met 
in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 (R. 82-83). Finally, paragraph 
The affidavit does not specify the minimum sentence of "not 
less than one year" for a second degree felony. 
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12 addresses the issue of a plea agreement, although perhaps not 
applicable in this case, as required by rule 11(e)(6)(R. 85). 
Defendant testified that no force, duress or coercion had been 
used on him with regard to his entering the plea, and he admitted 
as true the statement of the facts, as read in court, that 
explained the events giving rise to the manslaughter charge (R. 
184-85). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea defendant denied that his trial attorney explained 
the entire affidavit to him prior to his signing it and entering 
his plea (R. 193-94). That testimony contradicts his own and his 
trial attorney's testimony at the time of the entry of the plea 
and his trial attorney's later testimony at the hearing on the 
motion to withdraw the plea (R. 183-84, 208-11). Defendant 
further alleged and testified that he did not realize that he was 
giving up his right to a jury trial by pleading guilty and that 
he thought he would be going to prison for 18 months by entering 
his plea (R. 106, 195-96). It defies all logic for defendant to 
say that he expected a trial after entering his plea and at the 
same time acknowledge that he knew he was going to prison as a 
result of his plea. Moreover, it was disingenuous of defendant, 
notwithstanding his limited education, to assert that he did not 
understand that pleading guilty to an offense meant that he would 
not go to trial. Defendant had signed an affidavit indicating he 
understood that fact, and trial counsel testified that he had 
discussed that matter with defendant (R. 83-84, 214). With 
regard to defendant's claim that he believed he would be 
•9-
imprisoned for only 18 months, his trial counsel extensively 
testified to his discussion with defendant concerning defendant's 
possible prison term and counsel's calculation concerning what 
7 
the Board of Pardons would do regarding parole (R. 212-14). 
Finally, defendant asserted that he did not realize he was giving 
up his right to appeal his sentence to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 
106, 194). Trial counsel testified that he discussed with 
defendant his very limited right to appeal his sentence should 
the trial court exceed it's sentencing discretion (R. 211). 
In its memorandum decision denying defendant's motion 
the trial court found that defendant's motive in filing his 
motion to withdraw his plea was not based on lack of knowledge 
but on "buyer's remorse" after defendant found that he would 
serve more than 18 months (R. 177). It concluded that trial 
counsel's testimony was more believable than defendant's 
testimony (Id*)• T^e trial court's findings of facts were not 
clearly erroneous. Defendant does not challenge those findings, 
content to argue that there was not "strict compliance" with rule 
11(e), a less demanding standard than the more reasonable 
voluntariness/record as a whole standard. 
As explained in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986): 
[the position] that otherwise voluntary and 
lawful guilty pleas should always be voided 
when the trial court violates any provision 
of Rule 11. . • . is shortsighted, for to 
At defendant's first parole hearing on April 28, 1989, he was 
denied parole and scheduled for rehearing in January, 1992. He 
did not file his motion to withdraw his plea until five months 
later, more than 16 months after its entry. 
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follow it would be to sanction a remedy far 
worse than the wrong. If we were to hold 
that any violation of Rule 11 automatically 
voids the resultant plea, even when the plea 
is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we 
would encourage defendants, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past . . . and we find no reason to 
encourage such attacks in the future. 
Overturning such convictions . . . would 
require the State to reprosecute numerous 
defendants, probably long after the 
challenged guilty pleas were entered and when 
the passage of time would make reprosecution 
impractical, if not impossible. Almost 
certainly, the ultimate result would be to 
free a number of convicted persons for 
nothing more than technical errors in the 
acceptance of their voluntary guilty pleas. 
717 P.2d 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted). 
In so reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the 
"harmless error" rule would apply in matters involving a rule 11 
violation and that a rule 11 error would not invalidate the plea 
taken unless the error resulted in a substantial violation of a 
party's rights. Ld. at 1302. The Kay analysis is still valid 
law, and the Supreme Court did not overrule that case in Gibbons. 
Gibbons, read in harmony with Kay, reiterates the care that must 
be taken by the trial court to ensure a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea. It requires a greater scrutiny on the part of the 
trial court than a mechanical recitation of the rule 11 
requirements but leaves the traditional "record as a whole" test 
intact. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
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The "record as a whole" test was adhered to by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the only post-Gibbons plea case thus far issued 
by that court, State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989).8 There, 
Justice Durham relied on both defendant's affidavit and the 
transcript of the plea to assess whether the defendant's guilty 
plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, stating: 
In order for defendant's guilty plea to be 
valid and in compliance with rule 11(e)(5) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
State v. Gibbons, the record must shown that 
he was unequivocally and clearly informed 
about the sentence that would be imposed. 
Such evidence does not exist either in the 
affidavit regarding the plea bargain or in 
the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus, 
rule 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the 
vacating of defendant's guilty plea on the 
ground that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. . . . 
777 P.2d at 466 (emphasis added). Significantly, in his dissent 
in Smith, Chief Justice Hall also applied the "knowing and 
voluntary" standard in concluding that the defendant's plea was 
valid, referring to both the transcript of the plea proceeding 
9 
and the defendant's affidavit. Ld. at 466-68. 
In the instant case the record as a whole clearly 
supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
o 
Defendant's guilty plea was entered on September 15, 1987. 
g 
The State does not agree with this Court's reading of Smith in 
its recent ruling in State v. Pharris, in which this Court stated 
that the Utah Supreme Court in Smith "ruled that the test for 
complying with rule 11 is the strict compliance test articulated 
in Gibbons." Pharris, slip. op. at 8 n.6 (citing State v. Smith, 
777 P.2d at 465.) The State can find no such holding in Smith. 
No reference to rule 11 is made on the page cited, and the only 
reference to Gibbons on that page concerns the elements necessary 
for a sufficient affidavit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £&' day of September, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Stephen R. McCaughey/ attorney for appellant, 72 East Fourth 
South, Suite, 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of 
September, 1990. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State of Utah: Ms. Sherry Pagan 
Deputy County Attorney 
Provo, Utah 8460J 
For the Defendant: Mr. Bradley P. Rich 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right we wiJl take up the 
State of Utah vs. Frank Gene Powell. 
MR. RICH: Bradley Rich appearing with him. 
THE COURT: This matter is before the court f 
a change of plea. 
MS. RAGAN: Your Honor I have an amended info 
that I would like to file at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay, come forward and be sworn. 
(WHEREUPON, Ms. Ragan was put under oath by the Judge 
with regard to the filing of the amended information) 
1 THE COURT: Do you wish a reading of this amended 
2 information Mr. Rich? 
3 MR. RICH; Tliank you Your Honor no we would waive 
4 that reading. 
5 THE COURT: Okay what is the intent of your client 
6 to do with with regard to this? 
7 MR. RICH: To the amended information we are 
8 prepared to enter a plea of guilty. He and I have been over 
9 the affidavit and previously affixed his initials to the 
10 various paragraphs thereof. 
If THE COURT: Mr. Powell raise your right hand and b<j? 
12 sworn please. 
13 (WHEREUPON, Mr.Powell was put under oath with regard 
14 to the questions the court asks of him) 
15 BY THE COURT: 
16 Q Please state vour name and date of birth? 
17 A Frank Gene Powell 11/15/68. 
18 Q Do you read and speak the English language? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q What level of schooling or education have you 
21 attained? 
22 MR. RICH: He has gone through to the 9th grade 
21 the affidavit itself reflects as a practical matter he 
24 reads at a second or third grade level because of that I 
25 have been over with him every paragraph of this and feels 
3 
that he understands it. He does not feel comfortable 
reading such a document but I have read it to him. 
BY THE COURT: 
Q Are you presently being treated for any mental 
illness Mr. Powell? 
A No. 
Q You on any drugs or alcohol this morning? 
A No. 
Q No mind altering substances? 
A No. 
Q You have been over this statement with your 
attorney in some detail and you understand that you are 
waiving certain constitutional rights when you plead 
guilty? 
A Yes. 
Q Tho.se constitutional rights have been fully-
explained to you by Mr. Rich? 
A Yes. 
Q You have initialled each of those appropriate 
paragraphs? 
A Yes. 
Q And you are willing at this time to acknowledge 
that those paragraphs are true and accurate? 
A Yes. 
Q Has anyone used any force, duress or coercion 
A :VO. 
Q May I have a factual basis for the charge? 
MS. RAGAN: Yes Your Honor on this date November 
29, 1987 the defendant: and the victim were both at 
a party along with a number of other persons . During 
the course of the night the defendant the victim both 
and there was some drinking going on and some conflict 
between the two individuals , some fighting, verba] fighting 
and that sort of thing. They went out to the parking lot 
10 at one point and the defendant entered his vehicle. The 
11 victim was standing in the parking lot. He circled the park^nq 
12 lot and came around and struck the victim. The medical 
13 examiner determined that the cause of death was that blow 
14 from the truck. 
15 BY THE COURT: 
1$ Q You have heard a statement of the facts as recited 
|7 by the county attorney Mr. Powell is that true and accurate 
18 statement? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q If if i5 your intent to plead guilty you may sign 
21 that statement? 
22 (WHEREUPON, the defendant signs the statement) 
23 THE COURT: The record may show that the court 
24 has discussed this matter with the county attorney's 
25 office regarding the reduction in the charge by the plea 
185 
bargain under the circumstances and on the representations 
of the county attorney's department regarding witnesses 
to this matter and their testimony and the unavailability 
of certain witnesses who were there or their refusal 
to testify that this is an appropriate plea bargain 
and the court will accept that. 
MR. RICH: Thank you Judge. If I may approach 
the Bench? 
THE COURT: Yes thank you. The record may show 
that the court has received a statement of the defendant 
before pleading guilty . That he has appropriately 
initialled each of the paragraphs . This statement has 
been signed by those parties required to sign the same. 
The court will affix its signature. 
The court has further received an affidavit of counsel 
signed by Mr. Rich in this matter. The court will order 
those documents to be made a part of the file. 
BY THE COURT: 
Q Mr. Powell to the charge of Criminal Homicide 
Manslaughter a Second Degree Felony what is your plea? 
A Guilty. 
THE COURT: The court will receive and accept 
a plea of guilty in this matter. Do you wish the matter 
referred? 
MR. RICH: I would ask for a Pre-Sentence Report. 
6 
And if I could I would ask that this be put over to the 
8th of July which is the first Friday that my calendar 
will accommodate being back down here. 
THE COURT: Is your client on bail? 
MR. RICH: He is on bail and I would ask that 
remain? 
THE COURT: All right any reason why that should 
not remain? 
MS. RAGAN: No Your Honor. 
THE COUR^: It will be the order of the court that 
this matter be referred to the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department for a Pre-Sentence Investigation and Report. Mr. 
Powee you will report back here on the 8th day of July , 
1988 at 8:00 A.M. for purposes of sentencing. You will 
continue to be released on bail that you have currently 
posted in this matter. You will cooperate with the Adult 
Probation and Parole Department so that they may present 
this court with a true and accurate Pre-Sentence Report. 
Thank you . 
MR. RICH: Appreciate it Judge. 
(WHERUEPON, this matter was concluded) 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
1388 W 2 6 A«M|: 3 3 
wiLL-.-tMr.-jis.'-.r.imfi. UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******** 
) CASE NUMBER C $ ^ ^ >% C°\ 
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT 
BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
Defendant. ) 
******** 
COMES NOW -^<a._^to xi (*-jfe ^  ^  (5? r^ c\ \., the defendant in 
this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this 
statement on page five for the purpose of demonstrating to the 
Court that he or she understands the following: 
f P 
J r
 1. I understand that I am charged with the offense(s) 
* ^ L : x degree felony, or a Class misdemeanor. 
have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what 
it says. 
2. My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and 
how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to 
me. 
/ / 3. I understand that, if I plead guilty to this charge 
(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up to 
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to $ \ C> ^  ^ ^) 
r ' 4. I understand that the judge may sentence me to 
prison (or jail for a misdemeanor) and also fine me# or that he 
can choose between these two possibilities. 
1 
/ / 5. I understand that if I am sentenced on more than 
one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each 
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the 
oth^r^(consecutively). 
/ 6. I understand that I have the right to be helped by 
an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an 
appeal. If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will 
appoint one to help me. 
J
 * 7. I understand that I have the right to plead "not 
guilty" and go to trial if I want to do so. 
8. I understand that I have the right to a jury trial, 
which includes the following: 
A. I have the right to be helped by an attorney; 
B. I have the right to see and listen to the 
witnesses who testify against me; 
C. My attorney can cross-examine all the 
witnesses who testify against me; 
_ D. I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if 
they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to 
make them come and testify on my behalf; 
r-P 
' ' E. I cannot be forced to take the witness stand 
and admit my guilt, and I do not have to testify at my trial 
unless I want to do so; 
' ' F. If I decide not to testify, the jury will be 
instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just because I did not testify; 
G. I understand that I am presumed to be innocent 
2 
of the charges against me, and that this presumption will 
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 
I go to trial and I am convicted, I have 
the right to appeal my conviction. If I cannot afford my 
own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of 
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me. 
f^ I 9. I understand that during the trial the State has 
the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge 
(charges) against me. In my case the elements are as follows: 
/r A. That I; ^ S<^ K Or £ N G> ^ O v ^ & u v 
/ ' B. In V) T J ^ W County, State of Utah; 
g /) 
f/> 
. P. ; 
G. 
UL 10. I understand that, if I plead guilty to the charges 
contained in the Information, such a plea means that: 
fP 
y
 ' A. My plea of guilty is an admission of all the 
elements listed in paragraph 9 above. 
B. I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my 
right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and 
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to 
testify; 
r r C. I am agreeing to allow the judge to find me 
guilty of the charge (charges) against me; 
3 
_£ D. I am relieving the State of its job of 
proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; 
I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence 
me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial; 
I am giving up my right to appeal the verdict 
of the Court. 
A ' 11. I kn ow that when I enter my plea of guilty, the 
judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this 
case. I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the 
record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be 
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge. 
/ 12. I have entered into the following plea agreement 
with the State: 
Approved as to content 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
13. No threats or promises of any sort have been made 
to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement, 
Z/7 14. No one has promised me that I would receive a 
lighter sentence because I am pleading guilty instead of going to 
trial. 
15. My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I £L 
may actually receive if I plead guilty, but I understand that the 
Court is not bound by my attorney's words. 
4 
j£ ^ 16* I u n d e r s t a n d that any agreements made between my 
attorney and the State regarding recommendations for sentencing 
are not binding upon the Court. 
i ' 17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after 
full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and 
with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and 
circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea. 
l v 18. I have discussed this case and this plea with my 
attorney as much as I wish to do so. I am satisfied with the 
advice of my attorney. 
19. My attorney has helped me understand and fill out 
this form. 
/ 20. I am not now under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants, and I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went 
thrpuoh this form. 
' " 21. I am entering a plea of guilty to the charge 
(charges) against me because I am, in fact, guilty of the charge 
(charges). 
22. I know of no reason why I should not plead guilty 
to the charge (charges) contained in the Information. 
23. I have the following educational background; 
I can read, write, and understand the English 
language^* - ^ Y \*-*> C P<MD ^ u £v fe v, 
25. I am not presently being treated for mental illness 
that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make 
this guilty plea. 
Signed in open court this J — ^ of 
19 Sp/P 
A 
f^yN^ 
Defendant 
CoutTBel) for D<|ftendant 
• x s t n p t Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO&RT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH <^>l^W^^ 
****** 
THE STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER CR 88 69 
Plaintiff, 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FRANK GENE POWELL, 
Defendant, BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
****** 
This matter came regularly for hearing before the court on 
the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Deputy County 
Attorney Carlyle Kay Bryson appeared for the State of Utah. 
The defendant was present and represented by Stephen R. 
McCaughey Esq. Defendant, Frank Gene Powell, and his former 
attorney Bradley P. Rich, Esq. were sworn and testified. The 
court having heard the evidence, having reviewed the file, 
together with transcripts, and being fully advised in the 
premises now finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. On November 29, 1987 while attending the same party 
Mr. Powell and Glen Candland started name-calling and 
threatening each other. At about 1:30 a.m. these men went 
outside to fight, but bystanders prevented this fight. Then 
Mr. Powell crossed the street with two friends and climbed into 
his pickup truck, and again started calling Mr. Candland 
names. Mr. Candland followed the defendant to his truck, and 
begain hitting the truck's windshield with his fists. Mr. 
Powell left the parking lot by driving backwards, circling 
around, and finally entering a public road. Mr. Powell 
re-entered the parking lot by a second driveway where his truck 
hit and killed Mr. Candland. 
2. Mr. Powell fled the area. A warrent for his arrest 
was issued on a charge of criminal homicide, murder in the 
second degree. Mr. Powell through the office of his attorney, 
Bradley P. Rich, was surrendered to the police. Mr. Powell's 
charge was reduced by plea bargaining, and he plead gulity to 
the charge of manslaughter. He was sentenced to prison on July 
26, 1988. 
3. On September 28, 1989, after about one year in prison, 
Mr. Powell made a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. He states he 
could not read well enough to understand the consequences of 
his guilty plea, and his attorney did not properly advise him. 
4. Utah Code Section 77-35-11 (1987) states the court may 
not accept a guilty plea until it has found the defendant 
understands his rights including: right to counsel, right 
against self incrimination, right to a jury trial, right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses. Also the defendant must 
understand the elements of the offense and proof required, the 
sentence that may be imposed, any plea agreement reached, and 
the time limit for withdrawal of the plea. These findings tend 
to show that the defendant understands the consequences of 
pleading guilty. 
5. In companion cases Warner v. Morris, and Brooks v. 
Morris, the Supreme Court of Utah stated that although the 
defendant had not been asked specifically about one of his 
constitutional rights the record as a whole affirmatively 
established that the defendant entered his plea with knowledge 
of its consequences including waiver of the constitutional 
right. Warner v. Morris. 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) and 
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985). A review to 
determine if Rule 11(e) has been complied with has been based 
on the record as a whole. 
6. In State v. Gibbons the Utah Supreme Court stressed 
the trial court's duty to ensure Rule 11(e) and constitutional 
requirement's are satisifed before a guilty plea is accepted. 
State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d. 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The court 
reviewed the U.S. Supreme court cases, and detailed the 
requirements necessary for an affidavit made in advance of plea 
to be sufficient. Gibbons at 1313. The affidavit should (a), 
be signed by the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and 
the trial judge; (b), list the names and the degrees of the 
crimes charged; (c), contain both a statement of the elements 
of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that 
establish the elements of the crime charged; (d), clearly state 
the allowable punishment for the crimes charged and should note 
that multiple punishments for mulitiple crimes may be imposed 
consecutively; (e), list individually and specifically the 
rights waived by the entry of the guilty plea; (f), details of 
any plea bargain should be set fourth in the affidavit, as well 
as a disclaimer concerning any sentencing recommendations as 
required by Rule 11(e); (g), disclose the defendant's ability 
to read and understand the English language, the absence of 
promises to induce the plea, and the defendant's competancy. 
Gibbons at 1313-14. In conclusion the court in Gibbons stated 
that the trial judge should review the affidavit made in 
advance of plea, and question the defendant's understanding of 
it. Gibbons at 1314. "If the court does not use an affidavit, 
the requirements set forth in Section 77-35-11 must be followed 
and be on the record." Gibbons at 1314. 
7. Following Gibbons there was some confusion concerning 
whether the record as a whole was still the basis for review. 
This confusion developed from a Utah Appellate Court case State 
v. Visilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988). The 
appellate court interpreted the Gibbons decision in State v. 
Visilacopulos, and determined from Gibbons that the "record as 
a whole test" had been replaced. Visilacopulos at 94. The 
appellate court stated that trial courts may not rely on advice 
of counsel or affidavit made in advance of plea to satisfy the 
requirements of rule 11(e), but must conduct an on-the-record 
review. Visilacopulos at 94. 
8. However, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Gibbons, "If 
the court does not use an affidavit, the requirements set forth 
in Section 77-35-11 must be followed and be on the record." 
Gibbons at 1314. Also in Jolivet v. Cook, one of the most 
recent Utah Supreme Court cases on this subject, the record as 
a whole test was reaffirmed. Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17, 18 (1989). Because the record as whole test has been 
affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court, and it is consistent with a 
totality of the circumstances analysis used by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637; 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257 
(1976), the standard for reviewing Mr. Powell's guilty plea is 
the record as a whole. 
9. In this case the record as a whole shows the defendant 
understood the guilty plea he made and the rights he was 
waiving. The affidavit made in advance of plea included 
signatures of the defendant, his attorney, the county 
prosecutor, and the court. It stated he was charged with the 
crime of manslaughter, a second degree felony; and listed the 
elements of the crime as causing unlawfully and recklessly the 
death of Glen Candland. It described maximum punishment of a 
prison term of up to 15 years and a fine of up to $10,000. The 
Defendant's rights were included in the affidavit as follows: 
the right to an attorney, trial by jury, confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, avoid taking the 
witness stand, presumption of innocence, conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt, appeal a conviction. It states that these 
rights are waived by pleading guilty, and allows the judge to 
impose a sentence for the crime charged. See, Statement by 
Defendant Before Pleading Guilty. 
10. The trial judge directly questioned the defendant to 
determine his understanding of this affidavit. The judge 
asked, "What level of school or education have you attained?11 
The defendant's attorney Mr. Brad Rich, (an experienced 
criminal defense lawyer, with a fine reputation and a memeber 
of a well recognised criminal defense law firm) responded, 
"He has gone through to the 9th grade the affidavit 
itself reflects as a practical matter he reads at a 
second or third grade level because of that I have 
been over with him every paragraph of this and feel 
that he understands it. He does not feel comfortable 
reading such a document but I have read it to him." 
(Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 3-4.) 
4 N J 
The court directly asked the defendant, "You have been over 
this statement with your attorney in some detail and you 
understand that you are waiving certain constitutional rights 
when you plead guilty?" Defendant responded, "yes." The judge 
then asked, "Those constitutional rights have been fully 
explained to you by Mr. Rich?" The defendnat responded, 
"yes." (Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 4.) 
The trial judge asked to have a factual basis for the charge. 
The county attorney read a statement of the facts which the 
defendant acknowledged as a true and accurate statement. 
(Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 5.) The trial 
judge stated the charge had been reduced by a plea bargain, and 
because of witnesses unavailibility it was an appropriate plea 
bargain. (Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 
5-6.) Only after these findings had been made was the 
defendant's guilty plea accepted. 
11. However, testimony at the time of sentencing 
directly conflicts with testimony Mr. Powell gave in his 
affidavit supporting the Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty. 
The Affidavit of Frank Powell states: 
"My attorney, Brad Rich, did not read the 'the 
statement by defendant' to me and I was unable to read 
and understand it on my own; I believed that if I did 
not like any sentence imposed, I had a right to appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court; I did not understand that I 
was giving up my right to have a jury trial; I did not 
understand that I was waiving or giving up my 
constitutional rights by pleading guilty." (Affidavit 
of Frand Powell, page 1-2.) 
If this statement is true it indicates that both Mr. Powell and 
his attorney committed perjury. There is a direct conflict 
between the statements made at the hearing when the guilty plea 
was accepted and the statements in the affidavit supporting 
withdrawl of the guilty plea. 
1*79 
12. Defendant further testified at the time of the 
hearing on defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as 
follows: 
Question: "And did Mr. Rich instruct you to sign your 
initals on each paragraph? 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: " Okay did you realize at that time that 
what did Mr. Rich tell you at the time he started 
describing or instructing you in that document?" 
Answer: "He told me that pleading guilty to a 
manslaughter would be the best that he could do. That 
I would go out to the Utah State Prison and do 18 
months." 
Question: "Did he tell you were giving up a right to a 
fast and speedy trial?" 
Answer: " Yes he did." 
Question: "What did he tell you about a right to 
appeal?" 
Answer: "He said that I had the right to appeal." 
Question: "You had the right to appeal?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
Question: "Did yo know you were giving up the right to 
have a trial?" 
Answer: "No I really didn't. I thought I was going to 
a trial." 
Queation: "Did you know that you were giving up your 
right to testify?" 
Answer: "No I didn't. 
Question: "Did you know you were giving your right to 
cross examine witnesses?" 
Answer: "No." 
Question: "Let me call your attention to paragraph 
9(c) excuse me 10(c) that says, I am agreeing to allow 
the judge to find me guilty of the charge against me. 
Is that what you intended to do?" 
Answer: "No I didn't." 
Question: "What did you think was going to happen Mr. 
Powell?" 
Answer: "I thought that we still get you know go to 
court and hear a trial and the thing go from there." 
Question: "Did you think you were going to be able to 
present your side of the story to the court?" 
Answer: " Yes I did." 
Question: "What about witnesses did you think you were 
going to be able to hear the witnesses testify against 
you?" 
Answer: "I heard some of them." 
Question: "That was at the Preliminary Hearing right?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
-I ^ o 
Question: "Did you think you were going to hear them 
at a trial?" 
Answer: "Yes." 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 6-7.) 
13. Attorney Brad Rich's testimony was generally 
contradictory to Defendant's, and in particular he testified on 
direct examination as follows: 
Question: "In fact I think in the document marked 
Exhibit 'A' it indicates in your handwriting that he 
can read to a third gread level and I think that is 
what you told the court was it not?" 
Answer: "That is correct. That was my understanding 
that his reading ability was about a third or fourth 
grade level." 
Question: "What about his ability to understand 
English, comprehend the English Language?" 
Answer: "I don't regard Frank as a stupid person. He 
does suffer from, did then worse than now, suffer from 
a lack of a formal education and his vocabulary was 
limited. He was bright enough in any number of ways 
but certainly true that he wasn't sophisticated in 
legal jargon or in an extensive vocabulary." 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 16.) 
Contines next page. 
Question: "Exhibit No. 1 excuse me. Exhibit 1 and why 
don't you just tell the court what happened in 
realtion to that and when it happened?" 
Answer: "All right I had talked to Frank over the 
telephone about the proposed plea bargain earlier and 
at that time had gone over in limited fashion what his 
rights were. We met on the morning that this document 
was signed here outside the courtroom in the hallway 
and in the coffee shop discussed, for a period of 
time, informally what rights he would be waiving and 
what the penalties were and what my predictions of 
what the court would do and what the Board of Pardons 
would do. Then we turned our attention to this 
document. 
I went throught this document with Frank 
paragraph by paragraph. As Frank said, I read some of 
it to him knowing that he was limited in reading. I 
would say to do that it became obvious as we started 
that and after I had read a few paragraphs to him that 
the language there was, in some cases, confusing to 
him and difficult for him to understand. 
Question: "When you say #the language there' you are 
referring to the language there in front of you is 
that right Exhibit 1?" 
Answer: "That is right. The language in the affidavit 
itself was confusing to him. I attempted with every 
paragraph to paraphrase that in simplier language that 
I thought he could understand. We stoped really after 
every paragraph or almost every paragraph and had a 
discussion." 
Question: "I see in your opinion, Mr. Rich, is there 
do you think that there is a possibility that Frank 
was confused about what he was doing or wasn't really 
sure of the proecess of what was going to happen to 
him?" 
Answer: "I know that Frank's understandang of what was 
going on was more limited than my typical client no 
doubt about it. I felt that he, in the end, 
understood and had answered all the, I had answered 
all the question that he had about it. I would not 
have plead him guilty to this charge if I did not feel 
that he understood that. At the same time I know that 
Frank struggled with that more than most." 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 17-18.) 
Attorney Brad Rich testified on cross examinationas 
Question: "Do you have any idea Mr. Rich how many 
criminal defendants you have represented over your 
career as a defense attorney?" 
Answer: "Certainly hundreds." 
Quesiton: "You have never encouraged any to plead 
guilty I assume, that you weren't satisified with that 
they understood what they were doing?" 
Answer: "Absolutely." 
Question: "You have indicated that?" 
Answer: "I have I would not ever plead any client 
guilty if it was not my firmest belief that they 
understood exactly the rights that they were waiving 
and what the penalities attached to that plea were." 
Question: "So based on you experience with hundreds of 
clients criminal defendant clients you also had your 
firmest belief or had a firm belief that Mr. Powell 
understood?" 
Answer: "I did." 
Question: "Do you recall the morning Mr. Powell 
entered his plea of guilty the court inquiring of Mr. 
Powell about his level of eduaction and his 
intelligence level?" 
Answer: "I remember that." 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 19-20.) 
Continues next page. 
Question: "So you did go over every single paragraph 
with this with him?" 
Answer: "I did.11 
Question: WI read a number of the items and for those 
items that I didn't read verbatim I dealt specifically 
with that paragraph in detail in words that I felt he 
was better able to understand than the original 
there. I don't know how many paragraphs, I thank I 
could look back through this document and see how many 
times I would have been forced to paraphrase from the 
original. My memory is that it would have been a 
couple of three times that I chose to alter the what I 
felt to be words beyond his understanding and to words 
that he more easily understood." 
In addition to that with a number of these 
paragraphs I would have chose to paraphrase somewhat 
in that I might have said and the next paragraph says 
that you understand that you have the right to plead 
not guilty and have the right to go to trial if you 
wish to. So in that sense that paragraph would have 
been changed to, the one I am looking at is Number 7 
of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 to reflect my saying, 
'you understand that you have the right to plead not 
guilty' rather than the first person that is included 
in there. There would have been a number of times 
when I would have paraphrased in that fashion to 
change it." 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 21-22.) 
Continues on page 29. 
Question: "Do you recall specifically discussing any 
other rights at that time that he might waive in 
entering a pela of guilty?" 
Answer: "I know that we discussed what the penalities 
were and what the elements of the offenses were what 
the penalities were both in terms of prison time and 
the fine. We discussed the fact that the judge would 
be making the decision on that as to whether he would 
get prison or jail time. That he would be waiving the 
right to a jury, right to trial, right to have me 
cross examine the witnesses, right for him to testify 
and be cross examined in that setting. 
Question: "So you went through that with him on at 
least two occasions?" 
Answer:"That is correct." 
Question: "Were there any other occasions where you 
went through that list of rights with him that you 
recall?" 
Answer: MAs I said earilier we really discussed this 
in three different contexts, first over the telephone, 
then in person here outside the courtroom in an 
informal discussion where I attempted to answer any 
questions that we hadn't discussed. I went through 
this list generally to make sure that he understood 
where we were headed. Then a third time right after 
that with the affidavit in hand going over that 
statement paragraph by paragraph.,f 
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, page 29-30.) 
15. The facts and circumstances surrounding the Motion to 
Withdraw Plea of Guilty indicate the defendant's motive was not 
related to his lack of knowledge. Defendant anticipated an 18 
month prison term based on his counsel's expectations, but 
after one year in prison he found that he would not be paroled 
for another 18 months. (See, transcript of Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea, pages 7 lines 24-35, page 8 lines 1-14, and page 
25 lines 11-25.) Defendant now claims he did not understand 
the consequences his of guilty plea. The totality of the 
circumstances of this case indicate Defendant's motive is 
"buyer's remorse." 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The record as a whole is still a valid standard for 
reviewing withdrawl of a guilty plea. A review of the record 
as a whole supports finding the requirements of Section 
77-35-11 were satisfied. All the facts and circumstances, at 
the time the plea was accepted, supported the court finding the 
defendant understood his guilty plea and its consequences. The 
affidavit made in advance of plea, the court's questions with 
the defendant's answers, and a reading of the facts which 
defendant acknowledged as true and accurate satisfy the 
requirements of Section 77-35-11. This is further supported by 
the testimony of attorney Brad Rich during the Motion to 
Withdraw the Guilty Plea. The court finds and concluds the 
testimony of attorney Brad Rich to be more beilived than that 
of the defendant. 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied. 
Dated this 30th day of March 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYD L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Deputy County Attorney Carlyle Kay Bryson 
Stephen R. McCaughey, Esq. 
